

The economic outlook for the Skopje government is grim. Virtually forced into independence and with its access to the world's markets rendered precarious by virtue of the sanctions being imposed against the rump Yugoslavia and by the hostile attitude of the Greek government, it has few options and has seen its per capita income collapse from around \$2000 at independence to below \$700 in early 1993. The formerly heavily used two road and two rail links into Greece and particularly to the port of Thessaloniki, where the old Yugoslavia had special port concessions, are now largely idle. Links northwards, also two and two, are equally tenuous. There is no rail link with Bulgaria, only three inadequate road routes, whilst, although Albania's new railway between Durres and the Lake Ohrid town of Pogradec offers some potential, that is dependent on the ending of chaos in that area. Its isolation is thus extreme, in both the physical and diplomatic senses. The attitude of Greece is thus the key. Greece, probably more acutely than the rest of the world, is well aware of the dangers of a human catastrophe on its northern borders. With its support, the EC could yet decide to recognize President Kiro Gligorov's weak state: the alternative seems to be outside intervention and division, either following or precipitating internal collapse. Macedonia has not been so acutely divided for a long time. Perhaps this is what several neighbours want, but if Macedonia is not to become one further rung on the escalation ladder not much time for a positive initiative remains. "What's in a name?" Can it really matter so much to all parties?

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Cyprus: A Christian - Muslim Fault-Line.

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The Cyprus impasse is not as newsworthy as the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, because people are not being killed there at the moment. Yet the 19-year-old division of the island into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sectors remains one of Europe's most intractable territorial schisms between ethnic/religious groups. It also continues to be a major source of regional instability, not least as a fault-line between the Christian and Muslim worlds at least as dangerous as that in ex-Yugoslavia. The latest round of UN-sponsored talks ended in yet another deadlock in November 1992, despite strenuous US-backed efforts by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to bring the two sides to agreement on territorial adjustments within a federal, bi-zonal structure. A feature of these exchanges was the publication, for the first time, of a map showing UN thinking on where new lines of division should be drawn between the two communities. Rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, this plan envisaged the surrender by them of about a quarter of the 37 per cent of the island which they have held since the Turkish military intervention of 1974 (see figure 1).




Figure 1

Under international law Cyprus remains one country. The self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) is recognized only by Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot Government in Nicosia retains membership of the UN and other international organizations in the name of the whole island. This state of affairs is regarded as unconstitutional by the Turkish Cypriot side, on the grounds that the agreements which brought Cyprus to independence in 1960 entrenched the right of the Turkish Cypriots to participate in government on an equal basis with the Greek Cypriots, even though they formed less than 20 per cent of the island’s population. In recent negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side has accepted the “two communities” principle, but has been resistant to the re-creation of the sort of power-sharing system which reduced the island’s government to paralysis in the early 1960s.

On the ground, the post-1974 division of Cyprus into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas of control and administration has hardened into a *de facto* partition under which there is virtually no normal contact between the inhabitants of the two sectors. Stretching right across the island is what is today probably Europe’s ugliest territorial boundary, known as the Attila or Green Line. It is reminiscent of the Berlin Wall in its infamous heyday, except that in Cyprus the two sides are separated by a UN buffer zone. For the new visitor, this divide is starkest in the capital, Nicosia. A wander through the old quarter quickly brings one up against the barbed wire, concrete emplacements and armed guards which mark the dividing line between the two communities. If the visitor makes the crossing into the Turkish sector of Nicosia, through the Ledra Palace Hotel checkpoint, the first thing he sees, apart from UN and Turkish soldiers, is a roadside exhibition of gruesome photographs of atrocities allegedly committed by Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots before the division of the island.

Historical Perspectives.

That this polarization between the two communities was not always so is a constant theme of Greek Cypriot accounts of the island’s history. These lay stress on how Greeks and Turks coexisted quite happily once Ottoman Turkish rule had ended in 1878, and even before that date. But the outsider has to be careful in recounting the history of Cyprus, especially recent events and anything

touching inter-communal relations, such are the sharply contrasting versions given by the two sides. A key issue in point is the extent to which the two communities did live in amity in the 80 years before independence, when Cyprus was under British rule. Also crucial is whether the preceding three centuries of Ottoman Turkish dominion should be deemed to have established Cyprus, at least in part, as an appendage of the Muslim world rather than of "Christian Europe".

It is not disputed that Cyprus became part of the Greek world in the latter half of the second millennium BC, was a colony of the Roman Empire from 58 BC and took its place in the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire from 395 AD. Nor do historical accounts differ as to the seizure of Cyprus by Richard the Lionheart of England in 1191 and the subsequent sale of ownership rights first to the Knights Templar and then to the Lusignan house of France. Under the feudal Latin rule of the Lusignans until the 1470s, and then a possession of the Venetians, Cyprus acquired imposing historical monuments, notably the castles of St Hilarion and Kyrenia, both now in the TRNC. Also clear is that the native Greek Orthodox Church, which had been *autocephalous* and endowed with special privileges under Byzantine rule, suffered religious repression from the new Roman Catholic overlords. Accordingly, Turkish histories lay stress on the fact that the Ottoman conquest in 1571 ushered in a new era of religious tolerance, under which the Greek Orthodox Church enjoyed the recognition customarily granted by the Porte to subject Christian peoples.

Greek Cypriot historians do not deny that the Orthodox Church recovered much of its traditional status under Ottoman rule. But they point out that such toleration was dependent on a draconian tax regime and that there were regular bouts of anti-Christian atrocities and forcible conversion of Christians to Islam. At the same time, while emphasizing the brutal aspects of three centuries of Ottoman rule, Greek historians also lay stress on the "non-Turkish" identity of much of the Muslim population which Cyprus acquired during that period. According to Greek accounts, a sizeable proportion of present-day Turkish Cypriots are descended from ethnic Greeks who became Muslims and who for that reason retained close relations with their ethnic kinsfolk. Many Turkish Cypriot villages, it is pointed out, bear the names of Christian saints, whose festivals continued to attract a form of Muslim observance until recent times. The same accounts claim, moreover, that many of the "Turkish" settlers who arrived in Cyprus following the Ottoman conquest were in fact non-Turkish Muslim migrants from the Ottoman dominions in the Levant.

The aim of such historiography is in part to substantiate the Greek Cypriot contention that the termination of direct Ottoman rule in 1878 was not a national setback for the Muslim Cypriot minority, because it had few real ties with the Turkish rulers. Whatever the truth of that thesis, it is clear that the Greek Cypriots themselves regarded the advent of British rule as something of a liberation and, increasingly, as a prelude to eventual union with Greece (*enosis*), which itself had won independence from the Turks half a century earlier. For the Imperial Government in London, however, Cyprus had become an important strategic location when the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 provided a Mediterranean through route to British India. Second, it was established British policy to resist Russian ambitions to displace the sickly Turkish Empire in such strategic locations as the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits. A base in Cyprus gave Britain greater leverage in such matters.

Under the 1878 Berlin treaty, Britain acquired the right to administer and garrison Cyprus in return for an annual payment to the Ottoman Sultan, who retained sovereignty over the island.

Over the next 40 years *pro-enosis* sentiment among Greek Cypriots was encouraged by the pan-Hellenic nationalists in Athens, who aspired to bring all of the Greek-speaking world under the Greek flag. On the outbreak of World War I, in which the Turks sided with the Central powers, Britain formally annexed Cyprus (1914). It then tried to entice Greece into joining the hostilities on the allied side by offering the carrot of the cession of Cyprus (1915). But the Greek Government, then dominated by its German royal house, declined the offer. It was not repeated when Greece eventually joined the allied side in 1917, after the great liberal leader Eleutherios Venizelos, had regained the Greek premiership.

Although on the winning side in 1918, Greece was not awarded Cyprus by the Versailles peace-makers. Nor, as it turned out, did it get much of the Turkish territory which was supposed to come to it under the 1921 Treaty of Sèvres. Unwisely, the Greeks decided to seek a unilateral military solution to the post-war impasse on its territorial awards. They were soundly defeated in Anatolia by Kemal Atatürk's new nationalist Turkey and obliged to sign the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, under which "greater Greece" aspirations were effectively terminated. By that treaty, Greece and Turkey recognised British sovereignty in Cyprus, which became a crown colony in 1925. Then in vogue, population transfers of minorities caught on the wrong side of decreed borders involved the migration of millions of Greeks and Turks in the eastern Mediterranean region. But in Cyprus Britain's offer to transfer the Muslim minority to Turkey was taken up by only a few Turkish Cypriots. Under post-1925 British rule, there was a degree of inter-communal coexistence and reconciliation, notably in that Greek Cypriots generally accepted the dispensation of justice by London-trained Turkish Cypriot judges, and vice versa.

Achievement of Independence.

In the inter-war period, mounting Greek Cypriot agitation for full self-government and/or *enosis* led, in 1931, to the suspension of constitutional rule and the assumption of emergency powers by the British governor. Post-war British efforts to restore representative government ran up against the opposition of an increasingly determined *enosis* movement backed by the Athens Government. At the political and spiritual level, leadership of the Greek Cypriot cause was assumed by Archbishop Makarios III, whom the British eventually deported to the Seychelles in 1956. At the military level, *pro-enosis* EOKA guerrillas led by Gen. George Grivas launched a bloody campaign against the British military presence. As anti-British violence escalated, serious inter-communal clashes also began to occur.

For London, Cyprus had acquired added strategic importance following the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal in 1954-56. Although decolonization was accepted as inevitable, Britain sought a solution which would allow the retention of its military presence. Achievement of this aim was facilitated by the historic antagonisms between Greece and Turkey. The Athens Government and the Greek Cypriots continued to demand *enosis*, but this was anathema to Turkey, which argued in favour of partition. Both Greece and Turkey had become members of NATO in 1952, but Turkey had greater leverage within the alliance. It possessed much larger military forces than Greece and was on the NATO "front line" in the Cold War confrontation with the USSR. The blessing of Washington was accordingly obtained for a solution much nearer to the Turkish than the Greek position. This involved the creation of an independent republic within the Commonwealth, in

which the two communities would have equal status in important respects.

The Cyprus independence agreement was enshrined in four texts, known as the Zurich and London agreements of 1959. These were essentially accords between the Greek, Turkish and British governments, none of which felt it appropriate to consult the Cypriot people. Under a constitutional agreement, there was to be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, elected by each community, and a two-chamber parliament giving the Turkish Cypriots, by dint of their equal numbers in the upper house, effective blocking powers in important policy areas. Under a Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and Britain each, individually or severally, obtained the right of intervention to restore the political conditions specified in the constitutional agreement. Under a Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey were allowed to station 950 and 650 troops respectively in Cyprus. Under a Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over the Akrotiri and Dhekelia military bases, amounting to some 256 sq km or nearly 3 per cent of the island's total area. It is worth noting that Britain's retention of sovereignty over parts of Cyprus is without precedent in the history of decolonization.

Effective Partition of Cyprus.

Cyprus duly became an independent republic in August 1960, with Archbishop Makarios as President and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazil Kntchnk, as Vice-President. But like most power-sharing arrangements between antagonistic communities, the Cypriot experiment was doomed to rapid failure. Disputes about the interpretation of the 1960 constitution reduced the federal government to virtual paralysis in 1961-62. President Makarios responded in November 1963 by announcing 13 proposed constitutional reforms, including the removal of the separate presidential and vice-presidential vetoes and a reduction in the 30 per cent share of civil service jobs guaranteed to the Turkish Cypriots under the 1959 agreement. Amid a sharp escalation of inter-communal violence, the Turkish Cypriot ministers and deputies withdrew from the federal government and parliament in December 1963, claiming that their security could not be guaranteed. With Turkey making threatening military moves, the UN Security Council voted in March 1963 to send in a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP). By August 1964 an uneasy truce had been established between the two communities, but the pattern of increasing polarization and violence had been set.

The Turkish Cypriots never returned to the federal government system, which became effectively Greek Cypriot in composition. By 1968 the Turkish Cypriots had set up an "autonomous administration" with Dr Kntchnk as president and Rauf Denktash as vice-president. Efforts by President Makarios to gain active international support were hindered by the perception of him in Washington as "the Castro of the Mediterranean". At the same time, the Markarios policy of non-alignment brought few real diplomatic dividends, not least because of the powerful Islamic (and pro-Turkish) voice in Third World countries. A further complication for the Greek Cypriots was the military coup in Athens of April 1967 and the consequential revival of pro-*enosis* aspirations in Greek ruling circles. Prodded by the United States and NATO, the Greek colonels had a top-level meeting with Turkey in September 1967, but a Turkish proposal to partition Cyprus was rejected by the Greek side. Thereafter, the Turks became increasingly suspicious of Greek intentions and kept a close eye on the internal Greek Cypriot power struggle between Makarios and Gen. Grivas. The latter had returned to Cyprus in 1964 and had become commander of the National Guard. Still an *enosis* man

at heart, he orchestrated growing right-wing opposition to Makarios for his allegedly over-cautious approach to the national question.

Matters came to a head on 15 July 1974, when Makarios was overthrown by Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard, with the encouragement of the Athens regime. Grivas himself having died in January 1974, the choice of President fell on Nicos Sampson, a hotheaded former EOKA leader, who proclaimed the "Hellenistic Republic of Cyprus". Ankara's response was predictable. Invoking its rights under the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey on 20 July landed 40,000 troops in northern Cyprus, where they quickly secured control of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. Caught by surprise, and not authorized to fire on the Turks until it was too late, Greek Cypriot forces were in any case heavily outnumbered. British forces in the sovereign bases stood aloof from the fighting, as did the UNFICYP contingent. In the second advance, carried out in mid-August while negotiations were in progress in Geneva, the Turks extended their area of control to the Attila Line, marking the present-day boundary of the TRNC except for the interposition of a UN buffer zone (see figure 1). Meanwhile, the Sampson coup had collapsed (as had the military regime in Athens) and Glafcos Clerides has been elected Greek Cypriot acting President pending the return of Makarios (which was delayed until December 1974).

Much controversy still attached to the events of 1974. For the Turks, their military intervention was justified because of the real threat of enosis by force and the need to afford protection to the Turkish Cypriots. Pointing out that Makarios himself described the Sampson coup as "an invasion" by Greece, they argue that Britain's unwillingness to become involved left Turkey with no option but to exercise its rights unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee. According to the later Greek Cypriot version, the Sampson coup, while itself illegal, was used as an excuse by the Turks to implement a longstanding plan for the partition of Cyprus, in contravention of international law and UN resolutions. In this context, Greek Cypriot spokesmen have recently published maps from Turkish sources which, they claim, show that the ceasefire line achieved by the Turks in 1974 corresponded almost exactly with the boundary envisaged under Turkish partition plans of the 1960s.

Whatever the underlying truth of the 1974 drama, the outcome was the territorial division of the island which still obtains today. Moreover, the flight from the Turkish-controlled area of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots and the movement in the other direction of about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots had the effect of consolidating the military partition by a form of "ethnic cleansing". For the first time, Greek and Turkish Cypriots no longer lived in physical proximity in any significant numbers. At the political level, the Turkish Cypriots established a "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (TFSC) in February 1975, under the presidency of Dr Denktash (who had succeeded to the Turkish Cypriot leadership in 1970). Following the military coup in Ankara in September 1980, the TFSC was declared formally independent and renamed the TRNC. The new "state", under the continued presidency of Dr Denktash, was recognised only by the Ankara junta, which declared it to be "the daughter of our motherland (and) ... an integral part of Turkey".

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement.

The 1974 crisis and its outcome gave added urgency to UN and other international efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. Before he died in August 1977, President Makarios had joined with Dr Denktash in accepting a set of UN-

formulated guidelines for negotiations, including a joint commitment to an independent, non-aligned federal republic

which would be “bi-communal” (later agreed to mean “bi-zonal” as well). But under the new Greek Cypriot President, Spyros Kyprianou, the talks quickly reached the sort of deadlock that was to become familiar. For the Greek Cypriots, the creation of the TRNC in 1980 signified that the Turkish Cypriots, Kyprianou’s insistence on a “workable” federal constitution concealed a desire to relegate Turkish Cypriots to unprotected minority status. Complicating these constitutional differences were many complex issues to do with where new lines of communal demarcation should be drawn and how a “right of return” for refugees should be applied.

As deadlock persisted through the 1980s, two other barriers to a settlement came to loom larger. First, the TRNC authorities settled mainland Turkish and other Muslim immigrants in Cyprus. Numbers are disputed: the UN figure in 1991 was 40,000-45,000, compared with the Greek Cypriot estimate of 80,000 and the Turkish Cypriot figure of only 18,000. Whatever the numbers, the removal of all post-1974 settlers was near the top of the Greek Cypriot demands, a stance claimed to have added justification because immigrant Turks mostly supported the more intransigent positions of Dr Denktash. Significant here is the Greek Cypriot contention that the historic Turkish Cypriot community was readier to compromise than the newcomers. Second, the two parts of Cyprus became locked on an economic divergence course. After the 1974 events, Greek Cypriots complained that most of the economically productive areas of Cyprus (mostly owned by Greek Cypriots until then) had come under Turkish Cypriot rule. By 1991 Greek Cyprus had experienced over a decade of economic boom, whereas Turkish Cyprus had stagnated, to the extent that GNP per capita was over three times higher in the south than in the TRNC. Some observers argued that such economic imperatives made a political accommodation inevitable. Others contended that they complicated the search for an agreement, notably in that the TRNC economy had of necessity become highly dependent on Turkey’s support.


Through the 1980s hopes of a settlement were periodically raised, only to be dashed on the rocks of intractable basic differences. The election of a Communist-backed independent, Georgios Vassiliou, to the Greek Cypriot presidency in 1988 marked the start of another negotiating initiative, assisted by the restoration of democracy in Turkey and a modest improvement in relations between Ankara and Athens. But bullish deadlines for substantive progress could not be met, and in mid-1989 there was resurgence of inter-communal conflict in Nicosia. Placed on the diplomatic backburner during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, the Cyprus question then re-emerged as one of the international disputes which, under President Bush’s “new world order”, were ripe for resolution. Expectations of progress were enhanced when the disintegration of the USSR in late 1991, and the end of the Cold War, appeared to deprive Turkey of its traditional leverage with Washington as a front-line NATO member. However, although Bush got the parties to return to the negotiating table, another series of UN-sponsored talks in 1991-92 ran up against longstanding obstacles.

A departure in the latest round was the submission by the UN Secretary-General of his preferred scenario for a settlement, accompanied by a map showing how much territory the Turkish Cypriots ought to relinquish to the Greek Cypriots in a bi-zonal republic. Leaked in the Turkish Cypriot press in June 1992, the Boutros-Ghali map was eventually published on 26 August. It showed proposed new lines of division between Greek, Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administered areas,

involving a reduction in the area of the latter to 28.2 per cent of the island's area, from the 36.7 per cent held by the TRNC. Areas to be returned to the Greek Cypriots included the Varosha suburb of Famagusta and the citrus-growing region of Morphou, west of Nicosia. Envisaging the transfer of 34 villages in total, the plan also provided for the creation of a Greek Cypriot enclave in the north-east and of a Turkish Cypriot enclave east of Nicosia. It was estimated that, if implemented, the changes would enable some 80,000 Greek Cypriots to return to their pre-1974 homes and stay under Greek Cypriot administration.

Dr Denktash used the opportunity of the early disclosure of the Boutros-Ghali map to assert that its proposals were totally unacceptable (it being later claimed that over 37,000 Turkish Cypriots would be "uprooted" if it were implemented). Nevertheless, in Resolution 774 adopted on 26 August 1992, the UN Security Council specifically endorsed the Secretary-General's ideas, including the map, as the desirable basis for a settlement which would create "a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising two politically equal communities". Regarded as helpful by the Greek Cypriots, the resolution was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot as "an unhealthy contribution". His own proposals, asserted Dr Denktash, involved the Turkish Cypriots retaining "29 per cent plus" of the island's area, but he did not elaborate. While accepting the principle of the right of return of refugees, he detailed various conditions which, in the Greek Cypriot view, would seriously hamper its application. For the Greek Cypriots, a key requirement of any settlement was acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots of the "three freedoms", of movement, settlement and property ownership. To compromise on these, it was argued, would put Cyprus in breach of international human rights conventions.

Figure 2: The 1992 Boutros - Ghali Map.



The excitement over the Boutros-Ghali map in mid-1992 tended to obscure the fact that the territorial question was only one of several longstanding unresolved issues between the two sides. When Vassiliou and Denktash returned to the UN negotiating table in October 1992, the extent of these came into clearer light by dint of the Secretary-General adopting the unusual procedure of tabulating the respective responses to his settlement ideas. These showed that, whereas the Greek Cypriot side accepted the ideas and the map as the basis for an overall framework agreement, the Turkish Cypriot side could record its agreement to only 91 of the 100 articles in question. The tabulation further showed, moreover, that the Turkish Cypriot positions on the nine disputed articles, all dealing with crucial matters, were far removed from those of the Greek Cypriots. Apart from the territorial question, the two sides continued to disagree on the implementation of the right of return and the status of settlers; on compensation for persons dispossessed of their property; on whether Cyprus should have a single sovereignty (the Greek Cypriot position) or two separate sovereignties (the Turkish Cypriot position) on the extent to which each administration could conduct its own foreign policy; on the elimination of economic disparities; and on transitional arrangements pending implementation of an agreement.

As if this list were not enough, the UN report also showed that the Turkish Cypriots were continuing to insist that the posts of federal President and Vice-President should rotate between the two communities and that the federal government should contain an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers. The Greek Cypriot side responded that rotation of the presidency and vice-presidency was not acceptable and that these posts must be filled by "federation-wide and weighted universal suffrage". It also specifically endorsed the UN proposal that the federal government should have a 7:3 ratio as between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers, while accepting that a Turkish Cypriot should normally hold one of three major portfolios (foreign affairs, finance or defence). Last but not least, whereas both sides accepted the "security and guarantee" section of the UN ideas (providing in particular for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces), it was clear that they differed greatly on whether the Treaty of Guarantee gave Turkey a unilateral right of intervention in Cyprus.

With this array of issues remaining unresolved, it was not surprising that the autumn 1992 talks ended in failure on 11 November. Reporting to the Security Council on the deadlock, Boutros-Ghali recorded gloomily that a "*lack of political will ... continues to block the conclusion of an agreement*". Making it clear which side he thought was mainly to blame, he added that "*it is essential that the Turkish Cypriot side adjust its positions*" before the resumption of talks. This line was duly reflected in a further Security Council resolution (789), adopted on 24 November, which incorporated a set of proposed interim measures designed to remedy what Boutros-Ghali called the "*deep crisis of confidence between the two sides*" on the ground in Cyprus. These included a reduction in the level of armed forces on both sides, the extension of UNFICYP zone to include Varosha, the easing of restrictions on "people-to-people" contacts, the promotion of bi-communal economic projects, the carrying out of an island-wide census, and the launching of UN feasibility studies on the resettlement of Turkish Cypriots who would be displaced under the UN plan. Most observers agreed, however, that agreement to implement these measures would be almost as difficult to obtain as an overall settlement.

Some Greek Cypriot diplomatic analysts detected a ray of hope in the reference in Boutros-Ghali's report to the possible need for the Security Council to take "*alternative courses*

of action to resolve the Cyprus problem", given its stated view that the status quo "is unacceptable". This was taken, by such analysts, to mean that if the Turkish Cypriots continued to be intransigent the Security Council would have no option but to "impose" its preferred solution. As ever when such scenarios were imagined, however, the attitude of the US Government was seen to be crucial, and there were few signs of it being any more ready now than in the past to twist the Turks' arm into accepting a settlement they did not like. Optimists among the Greek Cypriots saw the US presidential election victory of Governor Clinton as potentially beneficial for their cause. The more pessimistic thought it unlikely that there would be any major shift under Clinton from established US policy priorities in the Near East, including close alliance with Turkey.

1. Alan J. Day, editor of the Europe section of *Border and Territorial Disputes* (the third edition of which was published by Longman in November 1992), visited the divided island of Cyprus in July 1992 and here gives an account, placed in historical context, of the difficult quest for a political settlement of the Cyprus question.
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