Project on the ECHR - Workshop on the 'ECHR and Human Dignity'

Thematic Workshop: The ECHR and Human Dignity
September 10, 2026
Palatine Centre, Moot Court,
Durham Law School

This workshop, part of an ongoing project of the Human Rights and Public Law Centre at Durham celebrating the (upcoming in 2028) 30th anniversary of the ‘new’ European Court of Human Rights and the 75 years of the ECHR coming into force, aims to explore the evolution of the Court’s case law in relation to the concept of human dignity.

Although the concept of human dignity is conspicuously absent from the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, it has emerged as one of the most significant and contested principles in the Court's jurisprudence. Appearing in over two thousand judgments, dignity has been deployed by the Court to reinforce findings of serious violations, most notably under Article 3 ECHR, and to bridge the Convention with broader international human rights instruments. Yet, as scholarship has shown, dignity does not operate as a stable, universally shared lingua franca. Beyond a minimum core, the recognition that every human being possesses inherent worth deserving of respect, there is little agreement, within or across jurisdictions, on what dignity substantively requires. Different conceptions of dignity, rooted in distinct philosophical, religious, and political traditions, coexist and compete, with significant implications for how the Court reasons, persuades, and maintains its authority in relation to member states.

With these developments in mind, the workshop seeks to explore the following themes:

• How has the Court’s use and understanding of human dignity evolved over the past 30 years?-In which areas of Convention law has dignity been most consequential, and are there substantive domains, such as freedom of expression, private life, where its function differs markedly from its use under Article 3 ECHR?
• What is the relationship between human dignity and other foundational values of the Convention system, such as autonomy, equality, and pluralism?
• How does the Court respond when respondent states invoke conceptions of dignity grounded in their own constitutional traditions that conflict with the Court's established jurisprudence? What strategies does it employ, and at what cost to coherence and authority?
• What future role should human dignity play in Strasbourg jurisprudence, and how might the Court develop a more principled and consistent approach to the concept?